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Abstract 
Heroin prices are a reflection of supply and demand, and similar to any other market, 
profits motivate participation. The intent of this research is to examine the change in 
Afghan opium production due to political conflict affecting Europe’s heroin market and 
government policies. If the Taliban remain in power, or a new Afghan government is 
formed, the changes will affect the heroin market in Europe to a certain degree.  In the 
heroin market, the degree of change is dependent on many socioeconomic forces such as 
law enforcement, corruption, and proximity to Afghanistan. An econometric model that 
examines the degree of these socioeconomic effects has not been applied to the heroin 
trade in Afghanistan before.  This research uses a two-stage least squares econometric 
model to reveal the supply and demand of heroin in 36 different countries from the 
Middle East to Western Europe in 2008. An application of the two-stage least squares 
model to the heroin market in Europe will attempt to predict the socioeconomic 
consequences of Afghanistan opium production. 
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1. Introduction 
 Poppy production in Afghanistan directly affects Europe’s foreign and domestic 
policy. Recent conflict in Afghanistan has lowered European heroin prices, increased 
seizure rates, and provided funding for organized crime networks and insurgencies.  This 
research hypothesizes that the change in Afghanistan opium production has 
socioeconomic consequences affecting European countries by changing foreign policy, 
drug enforcement laws, corruption, and crime rates. The intent of the research is to 
examine how the change in Afghan poppy production due to political conflict affects 
Europe’s heroin market.   A direct result of recent conflict has been an increase of 81% in 
Afghanistan heroin production during 2003 to 2008.  At the same time, the heroin seizure 
rate in Europe has also increased by 37%.   
This research develops a two-stage least squares model using data from 2008 for a 
simultaneous supply and demand of heroin in 36 different countries along the supply 
chain.  The use of a two-stage least squares model for the heroin market will determine 
the impact of Afghanistan opium production on Europe and create a price estimate.   
Two-stage least squares is a common method of analysis for a supply and demand model. 
These variables have never been previously applied in this manner to create an 
econometric model to measure the effects of heroin on Europe.   
Based on estimates from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Interpol, 
and United Nations, 90% of the heroin currently consumed in Europe comes from 
Afghanistan poppy production ( U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 2011). Europe is the 
ideal geographical area in which to analyze the heroin markets because of diverse 
demographics and heroin consumption rates per capita.    The world heroin market has 
11.3 million users who pay $56 billion to street level dealers annually, of which Europe 
commands a 26% share (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009).  
On the demand side, an interesting scenario occurs.   Islamic countries have a low 
number of heroin users per capita compared to Europe.  Sunni Muslims, in countries such 
as Saudi Arabia, are not allowed to use any intoxicating substances that alter their 
behavior and state of mind, thus reducing demand in a location where the percentage of 
Sunni Muslims is high.  In Shia Muslim countries, such as Iran, the low number of heroin 
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users is related to their use of opium in religious practices and medical applications.  Low 
heroin demand and increased corruption in Islamic countries allows the heroin to transit 
efficiently to Europe.  
In Europe, demand per capita increases in countries where heroin prescriptions 
are legal.  Liberal drug policy in this research is shown to increase by 188.27 users per 
100,000. Heroin consumers in the European Union often migrate to Germany, 
Netherland, Switzerland, or the UK where heroin prescriptions are legal (EMCDDA 
2011).  A country will license heroin manufacturing to private companies or use high-
quality seizures to sell or donate to pharmaceutical manufacturers to prepare licit supplies 
and research (EMCDDA 2011).  The licit supply will be administered in a designated 
clinic and the heroin must be consumed on site. 
On the supply side, heroin flows greater than 70 metric tons are predominately 
transported through countries with an Islamic population greater than 50%.  To put the 70 
metric tons in perspective, worldwide annual production of heroin is 340 metric tons 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009). A large dump truck can hold 20 
metric tons, which is the annual rate of U.S. consumption ( U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency 2011).  Low heroin use per capita, high opium use per capita, corrupt law 
enforcement, and an efficient supply network through Islamic countries allow a higher 
rate of heroin flow.  Corruption and law enforcement are important factors in the 
shipping routes and seizure rate.  A significant amount of corruption can lower seizure 
rates and negatively influence law enforcement or government officials, usually in the 
form of monetary compensation.   
  A recent history of conflict and opium farming in Afghanistan has played a 
significant role in the current affairs of heroin production.  Both the Mujahidin and 
Taliban relied on heroin profits to fund a percentage of their political and violent 
conflicts. Afghanistan is set up for heroin production by having an ample supply of labor, 
land, corruption, weak border control, and minimal law enforcement.  Warlords and 
insurgents have prospered from political and law enforcement corruption.  
Recently, warlords have helped the U.S. oust the Taliban, but are generally 
perceived to commit crimes with impunity.  Warlords are assigned to positions in 
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government, business, and law enforcement, creating allegations of land grabs, rape, 
murder, and kidnapping against them (Safi 2008). Although the Taliban are being ousted, 
they benefit from drug cultivation profits and convoy protection estimated to be $400 
million per year because of corruption in the government and law enforcement (Peters 
2009).  These Taliban profits allow the purchase of assets (ordinance, payment to 
government officials, and operational expenses) to protect their drug market and fund 
political objectives.  
The history and current affairs of Afghanistan discussed in section 2 have shaped 
heroin distribution and consumption in Europe.  European legislation has adapted to the 
socioeconomic consequences of an increased heroin supply.  This adaption is shown by a 
higher seizure rate in Europe over the last decade.   Next, section 3 discusses previous 
literature relevant to the heroin consumption and distribution network.  Literature on 
heroin seizure rates reveals how law enforcement can influence the price of heroin and 
prescriptions of the drug can reduce the burden on law enforcement by decreasing drug 
related crimes and violence.  After the literature review, section 4 includes the hypothesis 
of the variables, the econometric model, and sources of the data.  The two-stage least 
squares econometric model is applied in section 5. Section 6 discusses the implications of 
the model’s application and how an extensive econometric model for the heroin market 
may be developed. 
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2. History and Current Affairs  
 The development of the Mujahidin during the Afghan-Soviet War created a new 
era of warfare in the Middle East.  Insurgents travelled to Afghanistan for ‘jihad,’ and 
different groups have controlled Afghanistan since 1979.  In the 1980s the Mujahidin was 
the main opponent of the Soviets.  The Mujahidin lost power after the Soviet’s left 
because of civil conflict and mistreatment of the Afghan population.  The Taliban rose to 
power in 1994, with the intent of protecting the Afghan population from Mujahidin 
corruption.  In 2001 the ‘protection’ diminished and the Taliban was violating human 
rights and hosting terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda’s destruction of the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001 provoked the U.S. to invade.  Not long after the invasion a 
Taliban ‘comeback’ formed near the Afghanistan- Pakistan border.  The geographical 
features and weak border controls made this feasible.  The Taliban’s influence of power 
over Afghanistan affects the European heroin market and will be explained in this 
section. 
 
2.1. History of Mujahidin 
The Afghanistan War from 1979-89 was a conflict between anti-Communist 
Islamic Afghan insurgents (Mujahidin) and the Afghan government aligned with Soviet 
forces. The conflict had its origins in the 1978 coup that overthrew Afghan president 
Muhammad Daud Khan who had come to power by ousting the king in 1973 (Kopczyk 
2004).  In 1979 another coup, which brought Hafizullah Amin to power, provoked an 
invasion by Soviet forces and their installation of Babrak Karmal as Afghan president.  
The Soviet invasion provoked Afghan resistance and initially involved an estimated 
30,000 troops, a force that ultimately grew to 100,000 (Kopczyk 2004). The Mujahidin 
benefited from their proclaimed leader, Dr. Abdullah Azzam’s establishment of service 
offices (Maktab al-Khidmit).1   
The insurgent network of the Mujahidin used the service office as base camps to 
heal the wounded, hand out supplies, and train new recruits. The services office in the 
                                                          
1 Service offices are base camps outside of Afghanistan (i.e. outside the conflict 
zone).  Military training, supply depot, and medical capabilities are at the service offices.   
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1980s was run by Usama Bin Laden and Dr. Azzam; training ‘holy warriors’ from more 
than 50 countries to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan (Lissitz 2003).  Funding of the 
Service Offices came from private investment or foreign governments such as the 
Pakistani ISI and Saudi Arabia.  The Mujahidin received aid and training from the 
Central Intelligence Agency throughout the Cold War years, along with Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iran sending monetary and weapon support (Gress and Grau 2002). 
 The Soviets had superior weaponry throughout the conflict, but they became 
hesitant with their airpower in the rural areas after 1985 when the U.S. gave the 
Mujahidin antiaircraft missiles (Gress and Grau 2002). The conflict largely settled into a 
stalemate, with Soviet and government forces controlling the urban areas, and the 
Mujahidin operating freely in mountainous rural regions. As the war progressed, the 
Mujahidin improved their organization and tactics and began using imported and 
captured weapons, including U.S. antiaircraft missiles, to neutralize the technological 
advantages of the USSR. 
The Mujahidin maintained service offices throughout the world in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and the United States, particularly the al Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, 
Arizona, and multiple locations in Texas (Kopczyk 2004). Bin Laden wanted these 
fighters to continue the “holy war” beyond Afghanistan and Azzam wanted to keep the 
organization in the Middle East.   The creation of al Qaeda in 1988 came after Usama Bin 
Laden parted ways with his long time mentor Azzam due to Bin Laden’s demand of a 
global presence for the Mujahidin.  When the former Mujahidin members did not join al 
Qaeda, different sections of the Mujahidin formed into Afghan warlords, Taliban, and 
Northern Alliance. The Afghan warlords, Taliban, and Northern Alliance scope of 
conflict is in Afghanistan, unlike al Qaeda’s global agenda. 
 
2.2. Afghan Insurgent and Warlord 
In Afghanistan, a Taliban member can be classified as an insurgent. Insurgents are 
not like the ordinary criminal or lunatic assassin; the insurgent tends to not be purely 
egocentric, they are partially homocentric and violent intellectuals (Hoffman 2006).  A 
new network of political resistance has developed from the Taliban, populated with 
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individuals who are ideologically motivated, inspired, and animated by a movement or a 
leader, but the majority of insurgents operate outside any established chain of command 
(Hoffman 2006).  There is not a cohesive mission plan for the insurgents, just attack 
when the opportunity arises.  One individual may have the lead role, but they operate in 
cells independent from other cells and focus on small attacks.  When a large mission is 
necessary, they seek out a ranking official in the Taliban.  A certain cell may never know 
the other exists, making the organization elusive from law enforcement and military.  
This makes it a nightmare to trace their insurgent network, because they blend in with the 
civilian population.    
Afghan “warlord” is a term for a former militia leader during the Afghan-Soviet 
Conflict.  Following the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops, rival Mujahedin groups that 
had united to drive the foreigners out turned on each other, further decreasing political 
stability in Afghanistan erupting into a brutal civil war marked by warlord rule (Safi 
2008). The Afghan government collapsed and the warlord militia leaders seized territory, 
terrorized the population, and issued their own currency. The Taliban capitalized on the 
warlord’s individualist governance in each territory by eventually bringing the warlords 
together to form a powerful governing body in Afghanistan (Thomas 2005). The 
Taliban’s rise to power in 1996 came about, in part, because of their perceived justice-
seeking agenda for society with collective governance.  
 The Afghan warlords largely responsible for assisting the U.S.'s ousting of the 
Taliban in 2001 are now deeply entrenched in Afghan society (Safi 2008). Warlords have 
maintained their core militia’s in the form of private security companies, political parties, 
or business networks (Safi 2008). They have positions in government, police, army, and 
business. An Afghan citizen’s perception of a warlord is that they are protected by their 
influence and their use of violence, which threatens to undermine the very government 
that the United States and its allies are trying to build. Warlords can generally commit 
crimes with impunity, creating allegations of land grabs, rape, murder, and kidnapping 
(Safi 2008).  
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2.3. Taliban’s Rise, Fall, and Comeback  
The economic power of the Taliban transforms into religious justification and 
political expression.  The Taliban developed their expertise in warfare and conflict 
finance during the Soviet campaign to spread Communism in Afghanistan, hence their 
rise to prominence in 1994.  From 1996-2001 the Taliban was officially in control of 
Afghanistan.  The fall of the Taliban’s power came in 2001 when the U.S. invaded.  A 
comeback for the Taliban started after 2002. Their comeback is in a condensed area along 
the Durand Line (in the Southern and Western portions of Afghanistan), refer to Figure 
2.1.   The comeback brought a new political approach, one of decreasing certain aspects 
of strict Sharia law.   
The Afghanistan Taliban has never appeared on the U.S. State Department's list 
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, nor does it appear on similar lists maintained by 
Britain, the European Union, Canada, and Australia (U.S. Department of State 2011).  
Tehrik-e- Taliban is on the U.S. State Department’s list. They are a Pakistan based 
terrorist organization with no official affiliation to Afghanistan, which has claimed 
responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistan and U.S. interests.2  Only the 
Russian government officially considers the Afghan Taliban to be terrorists.   
The translation of the word ‘Talabeh’ means religious student.3  They call 
themselves 'Taliban' as in religious students who are imposing religious law (Kaplan 
2006).  They are not officially a terrorist group, just insurgents.  The Afghan Taliban is a 
local insurgent group whose activities and scope are limited to Afghanistan, and to a 
lesser extent, the border areas of Pakistan (Goodhand 2005). At this stage of its 
insurgency, the Taliban movement is opportunistic and religiously centric.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2  The statement was on September 1, 2010 from the State Department Assistant 
Secretary of Public Affairs, Phillip Crowley. 
3 Taliban is the plural form of “Talabeh” 
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 Figure 2.1 Afghan insurgent controlled area as of 2010 (U.S. Department of State 2011). 
 
Rise 
During the tail end of the Cold War the U.S. saw an opportunity to weaken the 
Soviets and gain the Afghans as allies.  The U.S. and other nations provided the training 
and equipment for the Mujahidin in the 1980s.  The end of the Mujahidin battle with the 
Soviet forces in 1989 did not provide political cohesion, leaving the Afghan government 
in disarray. After the Soviets left and foreign aid diminished, Mujahidin warlords were in 
constant conflict. The law and order of the country was in shambles, but the Taliban 
implemented governance once they gained control of Kabul. This was their “rise” to 
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power. Once the Afghanistan civil war was settled in 1996, the Taliban implemented 
strict Sharia law governing Afghanistan until 2001.   
Prior to the Taliban rise to power, the Mujahidin warlords collected tax revenue 
from the opium market.4  Copying the Mujahidin warlords efforts in opium taxation, the 
Taliban mirrored this scheme, but improved its efficiency.  The centralization of authority 
under the Taliban movement in 1996 ignited Afghan poppy cultivation and opium 
production.   
The ability to govern the population allowed control over laws and taxation. 
During the Taliban’s centralization of government, they collected an agricultural tax 
(approximately 10%), known as ushr, and a traditional Islamic ‘tithe’ known as zakat 
(variable percentages, 5-10%).5  The Taliban also taxed opium traders and transport 
syndicates involved in the transportation of opiates (UNODC 2010).  Areas under 
Northern Alliance control have taxed opium production and transportation, but it was not 
as consistent practice as for their foe, the Taliban.  
Effective control over the population was displayed from 1996 to 2001.  Under 
the Taliban regime, Sharia law was interpreted to ban a wide variety of activities in 
Afghanistan: movies, television, videos, music, dancing, kite flying, and beard trimming. 
Possessions depicting living things were forbidden, whether it was a drawing, painting, 
photograph, stuffed animal, or doll (U.S. Department of State 2011). 
International notoriety followed the Taliban’s treatment of women.  Women had a 
rigid list to follow in public: 
Women were forced to wear the burqa in public. They were allowed neither to 
work nor to be educated after the age of eight, and until then were permitted only 
to study the Qur'an. They were not allowed to be treated by male doctors unless 
accompanied by a male chaperon, which led to illnesses remaining untreated. 
                                                          
4 Opium is processed chemically to produce heroin.  Heroin production is 
dependent on opium production. 
5   This form of Zakat applies to production goods in Islam from wealth, 
production, and animals. Zakat is usually 2.5 percent of their income typically for the 
madrasah or masque, typically given in the form of cash.  Muslims fulfill this religious 
obligation by giving a fixed percentage of their surplus wealth, beyond one's personal 
needs. 
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Employment for women was restricted to the medical sector. They faced public 
flogging in the street, and public execution for violations of the Taliban's laws. 
                 (Rashid 2000) 
The employment ban for women caused primary school for boys and girls to close 
because almost all the teachers there were women (Rashid 2000). Taliban restrictions 
became more severe after they took control of the capital. In February 1998, religious 
police forced all women off the streets of Kabul and issued new regulations ordering 
people to blacken their windows so that women would not be visible from the outside 
(Rashid 2000). 
The Taliban did not hold elections because Sharia law does not allow politics or 
political parties (Rashid 2000).  Insurgents did not receive salaries, just food, clothes, 
shoes, and weapons. A March 1996 interview with Taliban member, Mullah Wakil, an 
aide to former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, reflects a fundamentalist view of justification 
of their war against non-Muslims: “We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 
years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are 
only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years” (Rashid 
2000). 
 
Fall 
In August 1999 the Taliban issued a decree to reduce poppy cultivation by one-
third (Goodhand 2005).  Taliban leader Mullah Omar issued this decree due to 
international pressure about heroin production.  The second edict passed in July 2000 
declared the cultivation of poppies for opium as ‘unIslamic’ or haram and the ban was 
enforced rigidly, bringing down production to 200 metric tons, see Figure 2.2 (Goodhand 
2005). 
In 2001 opium production was 200 metric tons, one of the lowest production rates 
in recent history. Undesirable weather conditions and the U.S. invasion to subdue 
terrorism after 9/11 also influenced the production decrease.  The production decrease did 
not affect heroin distribution because of an excess Taliban stockpile.  The Taliban’s 
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downfall began because of international pressure from the UN, the U.S., and other 
European countries for human rights violations and opium production.  Refer to Figure 
2.2 for Afghanistan opium production rates from 1990 to 2008.   
The Taliban appeared desperate to lift the UN sanction demanding the closure of 
terrorist camps, a halt of illicit drug activity, and the turning in of Usama Bin Laden.6  
Taliban leader Mullah Omar wanted to publically denounce the planting of poppies for 
drug production.  Despite the ban on growing poppy, the Taliban seizure and arresting of 
traffickers was still an issue (Peters 2009).  The Taliban crackdown on heroin was never 
intended to have real enforcement power, but to just please the UN.  This was due to the 
profit the Taliban received from the poppy cultivation and drug smuggling convoy 
protection.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 2.2 Afghanistan opium production in metric tons, 1990-2008 (UNODC 
2010). 
 
Comeback 
The Taliban’s comeback was successful due to weak Pakistani border control, 
utilization of the heroin network, corruption, and a decrease in strict Sharia law. The area 
bordering Pakistan is a nexus for the Taliban and poppy cultivation, refer to Figure 2.1.   
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In areas such as the Swat Valley in Pakistan, the Pakistani military needs 
permission from insurgents to enter.  The Pakistan government does not have control of 
land within their country. Campaigns by Swat Valley insurgents have been the most 
destructive anywhere in Pakistan. Insurgents and terrorists have targeted security forces, 
police, secular politicians, and government-run schools.  Without border control from 
Pakistan or Afghanistan, a network of weapons, drugs, and people can freely enter and 
exit Afghanistan.   
The U.S. is constrained by using a conventional military force for fighting an 
asymmetric war against the Taliban. Asymmetric warfare is between a conventional 
military force fighting an unconventional guerilla/insurgent force.  Asymmetric war is a 
broad and unpredictable spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations, 
conducted by nations, organizations, or individuals.  Specifically in Afghanistan, the 
Taliban uses their ability to attack and blend in with society because they are not wearing 
uniforms. The conventional forces can not seek and destroy the Taliban for this reason. 
Larger conventional forces are more prone to a weaker security protection, thus allowing 
the Taliban to pick their battles. Taliban fighters are local, and largely accepted by the 
Afghan population in the South (Pashtun areas). Former British Commander Richard 
Kemp said,   “Taliban in Southern Afghanistan are masters at shielding themselves 
behind the civilian population and then melting in among them for protection. Women 
and children are trained and equipped to fight, collect intelligence, and ferry arms and 
ammunition between battles” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009). 
Not only do Western governments have to fight an asymmetric war; they have to 
fight the drug trade. Opium cultivation represents a continuing threat to Afghanistan’s 
governance and has made a ‘comeback’ possible for the Taliban. This will hinder long-
run economic development and governmental efforts to structure institutions because of a 
system of corruption. Corruption within the Afghan government destroys the credibility 
and confidence to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban. 
 The opium threat will be contained and reduced by providing access to credit and 
subsidizing legal markets.  State and foreign government cannot stop opium production 
by eradication and law enforcement; they need to provide incentives for the producers.  
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Small scale foreign aid and Afghan government subsidized crop substitution programs 
alone will not eliminate drugs from Afghanistan. Economic incentives will work for the 
farmers, only if the country's corrupted elite is forced to cease collecting from this highly 
lucrative drug trade (Olcott 2010). 
 
2.4. Heroin Market in Afghanistan  
The economic effects of the Afghanistan drug trade have implications on the 
Afghan GDP, government stability, and property rights. The fact that an illicit 
commodity disrupts social and economic activity globally displays the indirect power of 
politically unstable states.  When using the basic comparative advantage model, a country 
rich in a particular resource would be better off specializing in supplying that resource to 
a country with less resource abundance. If there is a downturn in prices or the resource 
extraction is deemed illegal, the manufacturing sector of this resource can leave quickly. 
Opium’s byproducts (heroin) can be treated as a resource.  Afghanistan is set up for 
opium production by having an ample supply of labor, land, and minimal law 
enforcement.   Opium is currently a low-risk crop in Afghanistan due to lack of law 
enforcement and political conflict (Masfield and Pain 2007).   
Farmers in war torn Afghanistan cultivate poppies to earn three times the profit 
per hectare (Ha) compared to wheat.7 In 2009 the United Nations reported that Afghan 
farmers earn $3562 per Ha from poppies compared to $1101 per Ha of wheat (UNODC 
2010).  Ninety-nine percent of the opium was cultivated in seven providences located 
next to Pakistan in the South and West, with the Hellmand providence leading the way 
(UNODC 2010).  The Hellmand providence is the leading producer because of its 
proximity to the Durand line and use of water runoff from the mountains to irrigate crops. 
The post-2001 Taliban allowed drug profits to trump religion. The practice of 
Islam does not allow the use or sale of intoxicating substances.  The lure of profitability 
has caused Muslims to shed their religious practices in farming. The opportunity cost of 
farming an illicit commodity is presently worth the low risk in Afghanistan.   
                                                          
7 1 hectare(Ha) = 2.471 U.S. survey acres 
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Production has dropped less dramatically than it did in the previous decade 
because farmers have extracted more opium per bulb.  This is done because of increased 
eradication policies implemented under Afghan President Karzai.  In 2009 Afghan 
poppies yielded 56kg/ha; a fifteen percent increase from the previous year (UNODC 
2010). The 2009 cultivation has decreased by twenty-two percent in Afghanistan and 
production was down ten percent to 6900 tons (UNODC 2010).  By increasing opium 
production, production costs for other agricultural sectors are also increased.  Opium 
farms require an abundance of labor to produce a final product; this will raise wages 
within the country.   
During the Afghan 1979-1989 war with the Soviets, a system flourished where 
landowners and drug merchants would hire the Mujahidin to protect their drug shipment 
(Peters 2009). The Mujahidin used the profits to support the resistance against the 
Soviets.  The CIA and Saudi Government funds were not evenly distributed by the 
Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) among the insurgents in Afghanistan 
providence with a high Pashtun population.  The ISI distributed the funds to certain 
insurgent groups (i.e. Pashtun leaders) while excluding others.  The exclusion from ISI 
funds was partially due to the not being an ethnic Pashtun in Afghanistan.  This exclusion 
provoked some non-Pashtun Afghani insurgents to produce more opium, strengthening 
their grasp on the heroin trade to increase their profits.  
From the dawn of their inception the Taliban’s political objectives and religious 
principles were rigid.  Since 2001, the insurgency had decreased their requirements of 
strict Sharia law because of reliance on the financial backing of drug smugglers (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009).  There is a common misconception when an 
outside perspective is used to analyze the Taliban.   The misconception is religion trumps 
securing profits from drug production and smuggling.  Their rise to power was derived 
from a capitalist agenda of smuggling drugs for profit and using Allah for justification or 
the “ends justify the means” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009).    
Afghanistan’s opulent history of drug smuggling tactics has developed since the 
1979 Afghan War with the Soviets.  U.S. and NATO officials reported attacks on security 
checkpoints to allow convoys to pass and major diversions to draw troops and law 
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enforcement to certain strategic areas or away from checkpoints.  The Taliban’s 
application of ingenious diversion is not as well established in their accounting for drug 
profits.  The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) and the U.S. Institute 
for Peace estimate a profit of $125 million per year from heroin production and $250 
million for convoy protection (Peters 2009).  
 
2.5. Hawala Network 
The hawala is an underground banking system that facilitates money transfer 
without money movement (U.S. Army 2009). This is a form of a remittance system 
developed out of necessity in order to provide financial services in remote or 
underdeveloped regions where official banking systems are not present. The hawala relies 
on a theological law for regulations where the conventional ‘Western’ banking systems 
has faith in secular law.   
 A hawala network is simple to set up; all that is need is a phone line, and a 
trusted hawaladars (individuals involved in the hawala network).  Customers in one city 
give their local hawaladar money.  That hawaladar then contacts his counterpart in 
another location.  The counterpart hawaladar then distributes the money from his own 
account to the recipient. Within the heroin trade the extent of this invisible cash network 
is not known, but is assumed to be substantial.   
The Hawala network does not require a person’s social security number or 
identification card to open an account.  The efficiency of the network can allow a transfer 
to take place in a day or two, unlike a wire transfer that can take up to month to arrive 
(U.S. Army 2009). An example of being able to send money without authorities noticing 
is when two traders agree to a misprice deal.  A shipment that would normally cost 
$100,000 would have a value of $150,000 on paper.  The extra $50,000 is the drug 
money needed to finalize the deal.   
  Because of the large volume of transactions channeled through the network, the 
hawaladars do not have to worry about debt settlement (U.S. Army 2009).  Hawaladars 
are often members of the same clan or ethnic groups.  Thus, the individuals are able to 
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carry each others’ debts for long periods of time.   The hawala is mainly used because the 
money sent avoids a paper trail.   
Money smuggling is a different aspect of the heroin trade not related to the 
hawala network.  It is common practice for insurgent groups and heroin dealers in the 
Middle East and South Asia.  Drug cartels and insurgencies usually operate with U.S. 
currency.  Smuggling involves the physical movement of money.  Weak border controls 
in the Middle East and Eastern Europe facilitate this activity.  The Taliban utilizes 
traditional smuggling routes from the Islamic Caliphate and methods established by drug 
traffickers, arms dealers, and other organized crime activities.8 The Taliban also utilize 
air and ship transportation assets used by the Al Qaeda and various African insurgencies 
(U.S. Army 2009). 
 
2.6. Seizures 
Recent conflict in Afghanistan has increased production, lowered European 
heroin prices, increased seizure rates, and provided funding for Taliban, criminal, and 
organized crime networks. Only 10% of the heroin produced is seized. An estimated 
735,799kg of heroin was produced in 2008 and a mere 73,667.16kg was seized in route to 
final destination (UNODC 2010).  During 2003 to 2008 production of heroin increased 
by 81% and the seizure rate increased by 37% (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime 2009).  
 In the Middle East and Southwest Asia seizure rates have gone from 10,759.76kg 
in 2003 to 28,642.07kg in 2008 (UNODC 2010).   Political pressure and international 
task forces have increased the seizures reported within close proximity to Afghanistan, 
but not every country targeted drug smugglers. Pakistan has the lowest seizure rate based 
on proximity and drug flow.  During this time period seizures in Pakistan went from 
6,363.93kg to 1,900.36kg.   
                                                          
8 Islamic Caliphate refers to the Ottoman Empire (1299-1924).  Caliphate is a 
system of government established in Islam and is politically united Muslim Ummah 
(nation). 
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The Pakistan decrease in seizures is a result of weak border controls.   The 
insurgents use the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Durand Line) to their 
advantage, see Figure 2.1.  The rugged geography and political issues make this an ideal 
place for the drugs to flow.  The Pakistan government does not have control of the 
Durand Line.  The Durand Line marks the modern border with weak law enforcement 
and excessive corruption of government officials in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 
Taliban in Afghanistan and the Pakistani Pashtun do not recognize its validity because 
the border was drawn by the British government in 1893 (Hussain 2007).  Since 2001, 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan have forced the Taliban to increase their dependency on a 
weak Durand Line.  The U.S. was only allowed to use  a very limit amount of Pakistan 
air space just across the Durand Line and Pakistan did not have control of their Pashtun 
population near the Afghan border. The insurgents fighting the U.S. can cross into 
Pakistan and disappear.  
Transportation of supplies for producing heroin and the final product can 
effortlessly be moved across the Durand Line.  An estimated 50% of heroin is produced 
from laboratories in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNODC 2010). The other 50% is 
produced in Iran, Russian, and Eastern Europe (UNODC 2010). Precursor chemicals for 
laboratory use include acetic anhydride, ammonium chloride, ether, acetone, lime, and 
sodium carbonate.  The labs are far from elaborate; many are outdoors and use crude oil 
barrels, wood, straining cloth, and litmus paper. In the end, roughly 10 grams of raw 
opium can be converted into 1 gram of heroin.    
 On the Western European front, the UK and Portugal have seen decreasing 
seizure rates since 2003 (UNODC 2010).  The lower seizure rates in the UK and Portugal 
are directly related to increased seizure rates in Turkey and increased heroin consumption 
in Eastern Europe (UNODC 2010).  Turkey’s increased seizure rate benefits European 
countries by reduced heroin consumption.  In 2003 Turkey seized 4,705kg of heroin and 
by 2008 that number climbed to 15,447kg.  Turkey is a heroin gatekeeper for Western 
Europe.  Due to insufficient data from Eastern European governments the consumption 
can only be implied based on the shift in the structure of Western European markets.     
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2.7. Europe 
Europe was the ideal geographical area in which to analyze the heroin markets 
because of diverse demographics and heroin consumption per capita in the European 
Union compare to other nations.  The price of heroin has been decreasing since 1990 due 
to increased availability of heroin prescriptions and a steady increase in supply. UNODC, 
Interpol, and the European Monitor Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
are leading agencies involved with EU heroin issues. 
Currently 90% of the heroin consumed in Europe comes from Afghanistan 
(UNODC 2010).  Prior to 1990, the majority of heroin consumed in Europe came from 
Southeast Asia (EMCDDA 2011).  The heroin produced in Lain American is rarely seen 
in Europe, which is confirmed by the DEA, EMCDDA, and Interpol.   
There are many shipping routes through which smugglers can transport heroin to 
the European Union. The heroin travels from Afghanistan to Russia, Iran, or Pakistan 
before reaching the Balkan’s or Turkey.  If traveling through the Russia route, the heroin 
travels through Eastern Europe before entering Western Europe. When going through 
Iran and Pakistan, the heroin travels to Turkey before entering Western Europe.  Interpol 
has released this information about the shipping routes into Europe: 
 
Two primary routes are used to smuggle heroin: the Balkan Route, which runs 
through southeastern Europe, and the Silk Route, which runs through Central 
Asia. The anchor point for the Balkan Route is Turkey, which remains a major 
staging area and transportation route for heroin destined for European markets. 
The Balkan Route is divided into three sub-routes: the southern route runs through 
Turkey, Greece, Albania and Italy; the central route runs through Turkey, 
Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republics of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and into either Italy or Austria; and 
the northern route runs from Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania to Austria, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Poland or Germany. Large quantities of heroin are destined 
for either the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. 
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Although the Balkan Route is considered the primary supply line for Western 
Europe, Afghan and Central Asian traffickers smuggle heroin along the Silk 
Route into Russia, the Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and 
other parts of Europe. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan are vital transit countries. 
 
 
           (Interpol 2011)  
The many shipping routes of heroin smugglers and organized crime networks provide a 
sufficient flow into the European Union.  Substantial profits allow criminal and organized 
crime networks to prosper.  These perpetrators can afford to pay for protection: ordinance 
(e.g. military grade weapons and supplies), mercenaries, and incentives to corrupt 
government officials.   
Once the smugglers and drug dealers give the heroin to the street level “pushers,” 
the heroin consumers have options in how to consume the final product: inject, snort, 
smoke, or ingest.9  The heroin comes as a solid and must be turned into a liquid, through 
an endothermic process.  Those intending to inject this form of heroin must first mix it 
with, for example, citric acid or ascorbic acid.  Heat is not a necessary component for 
injection, just a vial to mix up the solution.  
The majority of Afghanistan heroin in Europe is consumed by smoking, snorting, 
or injection.  Injection is preferred due to the initial “rush” and length of “high.”  The 
injection consists of three uses for the hypodermic needle: intravenously, subcutaneously, 
and intramuscularly.  A typical dose is 100 mg at street level purity ranging from 7%-
43% in Eastern Europe to 30%-50% in Western Europe (EMCDDA 2011).   Smoking 
and snorting is prevalent when the purity level of heroin is higher. Smoking is done 
through a vaporization process, heating the solid heroin on a metal foil above a small 
flame and inhaling the vapor.  Snorting is popular due to no preparation compared to 
smoking or injection, but the length of the “high” is reduced.  There is a fourth method of 
consuming heroin, ingestion, but it is much less popular.  Ingestion does not give the 
consumer the “rush,” and the effects are far less potent.     
                                                          
9 “Pusher” is a low level drug dealer. 
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Afghanistan produces a brown heroin (chemical base) and countries in the Golden 
Triangle produce white heroin (a salt form). The heroin in the Golden Triangle is suitable 
for injection without heat, but is rarely seen in Europe. Most of the world's heroin came 
from the Golden Triangle (Burma, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam) until the 
early 21st century when Afghanistan became the world's largest producer.  The Burmese 
warlord, Khun Sa “Opium King,” surrendered to Burmese authorities in 1996 to avoid 
U.S. criminal charges for importing heroin to the U.S.  Burmese officials would not 
extradite the “Opium King” to the U.S.  The production of Golden Triangle heroin 
production never recovered and Afghanistan increased their market share of opium 
production since 1996.       
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3. Literature Review  
The research in this thesis uses the two-stage least squares econometric model for 
simultaneous heroin markets to test key assumptions made by earlier research.  This 
literature review covers previous efforts to analyze the heroin market, conflict, seizure 
rates, and heroin prescriptions.  Some of the conclusions are: conflict in Afghanistan has 
a negative effect on Europe by increased cost of law enforcement to combat organized 
crime, cartels, excessive drug use, and political corruption.  Significant profits from 
narcotics cultivation and trafficking negatively influence establishing a legitimate 
government in Afghanistan.  Seizure rates and heroin prescriptions are a European issue. 
Seizure rates show how law enforcement can influence the price of heroin.  Heroin 
prescriptions can reduce the burden on law enforcement by reducing drug related crimes 
and violence.  A negative aspect of prescriptions is that they may increase drug use in the 
country.  These issues will be discussed accordingly in section 4, Hypothesis, Model, and 
Data.      
   
3.1. Previous European Heroin Market Analysis 
 Amy Gibson et al. (2005) produced a trend analysis of the European heroin 
market similar to other analyses done by the UNODC, U.S. Congressional Research 
Service (Christopher Blanchard), and the World Bank.  The authors’ examine the price of 
wholesale and retail heroin under general heroin market conditions in Western Europe, 
the United States, and Australia over the 2001 period of Afghanistan opium supply 
reduction (Gibson et al. 2005).  The trend analysis found little evidence of a price shift in 
these three heroin markets as a consequence of the decrease in opium production in 
Afghanistan. There was no consequent shift in the overall price of heroin in either Europe 
(Gibson et al. 2005). 
 The amount of opium may have been stockpiled in Afghanistan or already in the 
supply traveling to Europe.  Dry opium can be stored for decades and then converted to 
heroin when the demand is present.  Despite the drastic decline of the 2001 Afghanistan 
heroin production, 20 metric tons as compared to an average of 200 metric tons in 
previous years, there was no evidence of a direct impact on the illicit heroin in the 
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European Union. Many large harvests in the 1990s and short duration of the Afghanistan 
production ban allowed the heroin supply network to utilize dry-opium stockpiles 
(Gibson et al. 2005).  The stockpiles contributed to the price being unaffected in the 
European heroin market because of the decrease poppy production in 2001.   
The authors’ observations highlight the complexity of factors influencing drug 
prices in destination heroin markets and suggest caution in predicting retail level changes 
in Europe due to opium production in Afghanistan.  The Taliban ban on opium 
production may have been a ploy to profit from existing stockpiles of opium.     The 
authors observed that the ban was only on opium production, not opium trafficking 
(Gibson et al. 2005).  The trafficking provides a significant profit for the Taliban.   
 The socioeconomic factors of law enforcement activity and other drug market 
conditions in a country play a significant role in the heroin market (Gibson et al. 2005).  
Law enforcement action along the supply chain of heroin can disrupt market conditions. 
Trafficking routes and supply destinations shift to areas that have a low number of law 
enforcement officers or a high number of corrupt government officials.  Law enforcement 
activity will also influence the number of property and violent crimes committed.  An 
area within a country that suffers from significant drug use has less law enforcement 
available to deter violent or property crimes (Varano et al. 2004).          
 
3.2. Conflict 
In Afghanistan, there is a long history of heroin production.  Svante E. Cornell’s 
research focuses on the interaction of narcotics and conflict revealing that few of the 
conflict zones produce the final illicit commodity, but instead focus on cultivation 
(Cornell 2007).  Once the conflict increases, large-scale industrial production of the drugs 
followed suit. The narcotics correlation with conflict has been a trend in Afghanistan, 
Burma, Columbia, and Peru over the last 15 years (Cornell 2007).   
Developmental economists suggest political conflict is a characteristic of every 
country, but violent conflict is concentrated in the lowest- income countries (Collier 
2007).  Economic development has a dynamic effect by allowing groups to engage in 
political debate rather than violence.  Economic development is crucial for preventing 
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civil war, which matches the ‘poverty trap’ proposed by Paul Collier.  A ‘poverty trap’ is 
a country with violent conflict, bad governance, landlocked with bad neighbors, and 
natural resource abundance (Collier 2007).  Slow growth, low income, and a dependency 
on a primary commodity for export are three economic characteristics destined for 
economic and political disaster (Collier 2007).   
 
3.3. Seizures 
The research of Weatherburn and Lind pertains to the impact of heroin seizures 
on the market price. The hypothesis proposed by Weatherburn and Lind is that large scale 
seizures of heroin which influences price and/or purity in the final stage of consumption 
(Weatherburn and Lind 1992).  In theory, as price increases an addict will quit using 
heroin, decrease their consumption, or commit more crimes to pay for the activity.    
Supply side law enforcement can increase the price of a drug if effective, but 
costs and benefits are difficult to quantify.  Weatherburn and Lind’s conclusion is that 
expected losses due to seizure are accounted for by dealers.  The substitution effect will 
take place with a high seizure rate reducing drug dealer’s supplies. The drug users will 
switch to a different drug until their old drug is available for distribution in the market.   
 To go one step further than Weatherburn and Lind, a large influx of Muslims 
immigrated to Europe in the last decade; this can provide a base for a hawala network or 
organized crime from Eastern Europe and the Middle East (U.S. Department of State 
2011). This network will be efficient in the distribution of the heroin and difficult for 
European law enforcement to infiltrate due to the ethnic and religious demographics. 
 
3.4. Heroin Prescriptions  
The impact of heroin on society has caused many European countries to change 
their law enforcement practices, domestic drug policy, and foreign policy.  Currently, 
heroin is legal with a license in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Switzerland, and the UK.  
Switzerland has one of the most liberal drug policies in Europe, leading to more 
illegal drug use per capita than other countries in Western Europe. The development of 
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“needle parks” in the 1990s brought negative international attention to Switzerland.  
Zurich experimented with a needle park where addicts could openly purchase drugs and 
inject heroin without police intervention ( U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 2011).  The 
“needle park” was done to reduce HIV by providing sterile injection materials and 
injection rooms in large cities. Addicts migrated across Europe to Zurich making it the 
nerve center for heroin use.  The “needle parks” in the end were a social hazard because 
of increasing crime rates and health risks. Closing these sites in 1995 did not eradicate the 
high heroin use per capita in Switzerland.  After the failure of the “needle parks,” the 
heroin prescription program launched in 1998 with 87% of the participants having a 
criminal background.  Many of the participants relied on criminal activity for income to 
sustain their drug use.  By providing heroin to users, violent and property crime 
decreased within the test program, thus reducing the strain on law enforcement.  
Research conducted by Killias and Aebi, who surveyed 600 addicts in the 
Switzerland’s heroin program for up to 24 months, found methadone to be an insufficient 
substitute for heroin (Killias and Aebi 1998).  Methadone’s ineffectiveness has brought a 
new policy to Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, 
UK, and other countries.  Killias and Aebi’s research provided the criterion to receive 
heroin from the Swiss Government: 
• In order to qualify, users have to (1) be at least 20 years of age; (2) have 
been addicted to heroin — daily use — for at least two years; (3) present 
signs of deterioration of health and/or social relations as a result of drug 
use; and (4) be engaged in conventional treatment without success despite 
two or more attempts. 
• Those prescribed heroin are assigned to special clinics that offer also a 
wide array of medical and social assistance. No clinic has more than 150 
patients. 
• Heroin can be obtained solely at the clinic, and it has to be injected on the 
spot. No heroin can be taken away. If the patient is unable to attend the 
clinic, he/she will be aided by receiving methadone. 
      (Killias and Aebi 1998) 
 
 The heroin program by the Swiss Government provided insight about an addict’s 
means of obtaining heroin, supplemental drug use, and crimes committed. The 
prescription program covers 3000 users, who prior to the program, generally sold drugs 
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to finance their own habit.  If a drug market relies on users to be suppliers, then 
decreasing users reduces narcotics availability in Europe. 
  Heroin users will reduce their search for alternatives when the presence of 
government intervention through administration is available.  Heroin users will be 
susceptible to the substitution effect if heroin is not available; they just want their “fix or 
high.”  The data collected from Killias and Aebi shows a decline in nonprescription 
heroin and other illicit drugs when the government administers the heroin.  Killias and 
Aebi’s research found illicit drug use in which 15% of users did not consume other 
alternatives after six months and 41% after 18 months.  After 18 months of treatment, 
75% of daily users did not use nonprescription heroin. Only 7% of the government 
prescriptions users consumed illegal and legal heroin.  The Switzerland heroin 
prescription program does significantly reduce illegal drug purchases and drug-related 
crimes, but does not reduce heroin consumption.  The number of heroin users stayed 
constant or increased.   
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4. Hypothesis, Data, and Model 
The initial intent of this research was to determine the negative effects of 
increased opium production created by Operation Enduring Freedom.  The research 
would have measured the number of U.S. troops and the effects of poppy production.  
However, as the research progressed it became apparent that the issue is more dynamic 
than merely tracing the effects of Operation Enduring Freedom.  The research uses 
national security policy, criminal justice theory, international economics, and world 
politics to provide the necessary components to model the heroin market.   
Afghanistan has been in the international spotlight since 1979.  International 
pressure from many European countries and the United Nations about Afghanistan’s 
poppy production, Taliban’s governance in regard to human rights, corruption in the 
Afghan government, allies of the Taliban (i.e. terrorist camps), how drug use affects the 
crime rate in Europe, and price decrease in the European heroin market since 1990 (refer 
to Figure 5.1) lead to invasion by ‘Western’ forces in 2001.  These circumstances have 
caused changes in European drug policy, law enforcement policy, foreign intervention in 
Afghanistan to stabilize the region, and general political unrest. 
Since 1979, the two stable job markets in Afghanistan have been war and poppy 
farming.   Recent violent conflict has caused a surge of refugees to leave Afghanistan for 
Iran and Pakistan.  By 2001, over seven million Afghan’s were displaced and at the start 
of 2002 at least 4.8 million people have returned to Afghanistan (Margesson 2007).  The 
return was caused by the U.S. brining some political stability to the country. Despite the 
massive returns, up to 2.46 million refugees remain in Pakistan and more than 900,000 in 
Iran, which makes Afghans the second-largest refugee population in the world 
(Margesson 2007).  Generally, refugees are not particular in what job they do, they just 
want to survive.    
Comparative advantage is a factor in the access that poppy farmers have to labor 
(i.e. high refugee population and unemployment rate) and opium distribution markets.  
They do not see the difference between a poppy or wheat field.  Opium is considered a 
low-risk crop in a high-risk Afghanistan environment.  In many ways, the Afghanistan 
labor market benefits from opium production.  
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Heroin prices are a reflection of supply and demand, just like anything else.  This 
leads to many variables that influence a simultaneous supply and demand model for 
heroin.  After further research, more information in the global heroin market developed.   
Europe’s heroin consumption is part of the recent history and data was readily available 
from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), European Monitoring 
Center for Drugs and Addiction (EMCDDA), and the White House Office of National 
Drug Control Policy. Afghanistan’s poppy production fuels 90% of the world’s heroin 
supply, creates work for the unemployed and refugees, and contributes to violent conflict.  
 An application of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to the heroin market 
in Europe will attempt to predict the socioeconomic consequences of Afghanistan opium 
production. 2SLS is a method of systematically creating an instrumental variable to 
replace an endogenous variable where they appear as explanatory variables in 
simultaneous equation systems (Studenmund 2010).   An endogenous variable is 
determined within a system of equations which represent in this case, the price of heroin.  
 The main reason for using 2SLS is to develop a simultaneous set of equations to 
describe the market conditions of the time period.  In the heroin market there is dual 
causality and 2SLS reduces the bias and inconsistency of the estimates (Studenmund 
2010).  Through optimization it was shown that consumption and supply decisions were 
not separable.  The econometric model specified dual causality between heroin 
consumption and supply, and thereby used a simultaneous equation system.  A 2SLS 
estimation with instruments was used in the price function estimation to control the 
endogeneity in the model.  Endogeneity is the correlation between the error term and 
independent variable in the econometric model.   
The first stage will use predetermined variables to estimate a heroin price, which 
is used in the second stage supply and demand equations.  Predetermined variables are 
exogenous to the system and individual variables such as the amount of foreign aid a 
country receives, the amount corruption based on an index, homicide rate within the 
country, the number of law enforcement officers in the country, if heroin prescriptions 
are legal, if the country is a major shipping route, and if at least 50% of the country 
follows the Islamic religion.  These exogenous variables will estimate a heroin price for 
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the equation systems in the current time period.   Once the price is estimated from the 
exogenous variables, the second stage begins.  The estimated price from stage one is 
substituted on the right side of the supply and demand equations for the heroin market.   
 
4.1. Hypothesis 
What is hypothesized by this research is that the increasing Afghanistan opium 
production has socioeconomic consequences affecting European countries by changing 
foreign policy, drug enforcement laws, corruption, and crime rates. The intent of the 
research is to examine how the change in Afghan poppy production due to political 
conflict affects Europe’s heroin market. Heroin prices are a reflection of supply and 
demand, and similar to any other market, profits motivate participation.  Each country is 
unique in their governance and demographics.  The independent variables have a specific 
purpose in navigating the heroin markets.  This market is dynamic and ever evolving. 
Multiple sources form a cross-sectional data set of 36 countries for 2008, shown 
in Table 4.2. The variables used in the econometric model are listed in italics.   The main 
variables are the price (PRICE), number of heroin users (USER), and the supply of heroin 
available for consumption in each country (SUPPLY). These data are obtained from 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The estimates obtained from the 
UNODC were cross referenced with the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and 
Addiction (EMCDDA).  Estimates from the UNODC are reliable in regard to narcotic 
data; the information is submitted directly to the UN by the countries government.10  In 
the data set there was a requirement that each country’s population had to be greater than 
1,000,000.  USER and SUPPLY are per 100,000.  To calculate SUPPLY, the heroin 
supply minus the heroin seizures estimates the variable in kilograms.  
PRICE  is the price per gram of heroin in each country (2008 dollars). AID  is the 
amount of foreign aid dispersed to a country for loans, military aid, and relief assistance 
(2008 dollars). INCORRUPT is a measure where the higher score means less perceived 
corruption ranging from 0 to 10.  HOMICIDE is the amount of assaults that lead to death 
                                                          
10 Some information is collected by survey to check the accuracy of the 
government information handed to the UNODC. 
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per 100,000.  LE is the number of local and providential officers per 100,000.  MUSLIM 
is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if Muslim religion population is greater than 
50% and 0 otherwise.  SCRIPT is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if a licensed 
medical professional can prescribe heroin and 0 otherwise. SHIP is a dummy variable 
pertaining to heroin flows that were above 70 metric tons (mt) assigned a value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
 With regard to LE, the law enforcement officers per capita will determine the 
reduction in heroin supplied.  Heroin distribution is illegal and government sets law 
enforcement policy.  An allocation of funding will be determined by the amount of illicit 
transactions that cause social problems.  Thus, spending money to control heroin 
trafficking is a valid option. In theory if this scenario works out, law enforcement will 
have a negative effect on the supply. Another alternative is increasing the punishment for 
the offense. This will enable a country to have fewer law enforcement officers, due to the 
high penalty for committing the offense. LE is only used in the supply model because 
most heroin users do not worry about the police due to their addiction. 
  Officials from the governing bodies, agencies, and organizations use of power 
for private gain were surveyed for this measure.  This means that LE can increase 
INCORRUPT, which should have a negative effect on SUPPLY.  If the country has more 
corruption (i.e. a lower score), then a larger supply of heroin will be present.   
HOMICIDE, which is an indicator of the number of violent crimes in a country, 
correlates with drug use, but it is not a predetermined cause.  Drug use does not cause a 
violent event, but there is a correlation between mood altering substances and increased 
likelihood of violence.  The research by Killias and Abei in Switzerland has shown that 
heroin users are often also street level dealers (Killias and Aebi 1998). The highest-level 
dealers are not generally drug users, but are motivated by profit and use violence to 
protect their assets. Organized crime networks, drug dealers, and insurgents protecting 
their product or general business will result in more violent crime.  A high HOMICIDE 
rate per 100,000 indicates weak law enforcement and high presence of organized crime, 
which may lead to a higher presence of drug related crime.  
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Foreign aid (AID) from the World Bank, IMF, UN, EU, and U.S. provide for 
development and sustainable independent government function. The amount of AID 
received by a country will be a proxy for violent conflict and political stability.  Foreign 
aid also correlates with high unemployment rates and flat or regressive economic growth.  
These factors are correlated with high drug use.  A country with high levels of AID may 
have increased USER and SUPPLY, but will be tested in the USER equation.  
Rampant heroin use in Europe provoked legal heroin prescriptions to reduce 
heroin user’s dependency and control transmissible diseases.  SCRIPT may have a 
positive impact on USER because heroin users will migrate to the countries with legal 
prescriptions, thus increasing the demand. From the Switzerland research done on 
prescriptions, some users may quit using heroin, but the program will entice others due a 
decrease in legal repercussions (Killias and Aebi 1998).     
Going in the negative direction is MUSLIM. This variable will have a drastically 
negative effect on heroin consumption because Sharia law is a deterrence factor for 
believers in Islam.   
Thus SHIP has a positive effect on SUPPLY. The major shipping routes are 
predominately through countries with a Muslim population greater than 50%.11  This 
network of Muslim countries allow for the hawala network to work efficiently and 
increase the drug flow into Europe.   
 Heroin price is significant in the market, but different factors affect the suppliers 
and users, thus two different assumptions for PRICE can be hypothesized. The number of 
heroin users in the network is assumed to have remained relatively flat, new users enter 
the market and prolonged users exit the market due to death, imprisonment, etc. A drastic 
price increase will be a deterring factor.  PRICE should have a negative effect on USER.  
The average price at the street level throughout the 36 countries has decreased 
consistently since the 1990s. The supply of heroin entering these countries has also 
increased during that period.  Heroin consumption has decreased in Western Europe, but 
increased in Eastern Europe. PRICE increases will have a positive impact on SUPPLY, if 
inputs remain constant.  Within the heroin network prices per gram have fluctuated, but 
                                                          
11 15% of Russia’s population is Islamic.   
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average heroin price in the 36 countries analyzed have decreased.  The heroin market is 
hypothesized to follow the law of demand and supply, but when the drug is combined 
with other opioids and opiates the market change and will be explained in section 5.  
 
4.2. Model 
A potential simultaneity issue confronts price. Several independent variables that 
affect supply also influence demand. The model in the regression is two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), a common method of analysis for a supply and demand model.  An 
estimation bias in 2SLS is common; between the independent variable and the error term.  
The 2SLS model accounts for this and the regression is unbiased.   
Price is a sufficient proxy for the endogenous variable and can be used as an 
instrumental variable. This will create an explanatory variable uncorrelated with the error 
term.  The first stage will use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equation to run the reduced-
form equation for the endogenous variable PRICE that appears as an explanatory variable 
in the structural equations in the system.  These exogenous variables will be used to 
create an estimate of the endogenous variable.  A new variable developed from the 
equation is PRICE^, which can be used in the second stage of the regression.       
The first regression in stage two estimates the effect that the independents have on 
the USER in each country.  SUPPLY is the dependent variable for the next regression 
using PRICE^.  Both of these equations work simultaneously to model the quantity 
supplied and demanded.  The quantity demanded is the supply minus heroin seizures.  
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The independent variables used in each regression: 
- (PRICE)^: the price per gram of heroin in each country (2008 dollars). 
- (AID):  the amount of foreign aid dispersed to a country for loans, military aid, 
and relief assistance (2008 dollars). 
- (INCORRUPT): a measure where the higher score means less perceived 
corruption ranging from 0 to 10. 
- (HOMICIDE): the number of deadly assaults per 100,000. 
- (LE): the number of local and providential law enforcement officers per 100,000. 
- (MUSLIM): a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if Muslim religion population 
is greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. 
- (SCRIPT): a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if a licensed medical 
professional can prescribe heroin and 0 otherwise. 
- (SHIP): a dummy variable pertaining to heroin flows above 70 (mt) per year are 
assigned a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
- (i): the country in the cross sectional data 
The main heroin supply and demand regression is specified as: 
First Stage: 
(PRICEi) = β0 + β1(AIDi) + β2(INCORRUPTi) + β3(HOMICIDEi) + β4(LEi) + 
β5(MUSLIMi) + β6(SCRIPTi) + β7(SHIPi) + εit 
Second Stage: 
(USERi) = β0 - β1(PRICEi)^ + β2(AIDi) + β3(HOMICIDEi) - β4(MUSLIMi) + β5(SCRIPTi) 
+ εit 
(SUPPLYi) = β0 +β1(PRICEi)^ - β2(INCORRUPTi) - β3(LEi) + β4(SHIPi) + εit 
where PRICEi^ is the estimated value of PRICEi from the first regression. 
 
4.3. Data 
When price is a component, it is in 2008 U.S. dollars.  The heroin price per gram 
(PRICE) is taken from the UNODC 2010 World Drug Report.  PRICE is compared 
against reports from the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy and the 
EMCDDA to judge accuracy.  
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 Major shipping routes (SHIP) are derived from UNODC; tracing the amount of 
heroin produced, exported, and consumed in each country. This is an integral source for 
analysis. SHIP is a dummy variable used for heroin flows in metric tons (mt) that were 
above 70mt assigned a 1, otherwise a 0.  Global heroin consumption is an estimated 
340mt (UNODC 2010).   
Law enforcement (LE) is provided by each individual country in reports published 
by their executive branch, embassy, or national law enforcement agency per 100,000 
people.  Most reports establish the number of office workers and actual police officers.  
This measure looks at the officers employed by local or provincial authorities. 
Aid (AID) is a combination of loans, military aid, and relief assistance in 2008 
U.S. dollars.  The information was obtained from the IMF, World Bank, European Union, 
Brookings Institute, and the United Nations.  Foreign aid is a proxy for GDP in this 
pricing model; displaying the efficiency of the government.  A country that receives a 
significant amount of foreign aid is generally assumed to have bad governance and 
inefficient law enforcement, creating a conflict trap (Collier 2007).  The governance and 
law enforcement can lead to increased corruption allowing for a prosperous illicit drug 
market.   
A variable to account for religion (MUSLIM) provides population distribution for 
each country being at least 50% Islamic (U.S. Department of State 2011).  MUSLIM is a 
dummy variable assigned a 1 if the country in question is 50% or greater and 0 otherwise.   
A country that is incorrupt (INCORRUPT) has a higher score meaning less 
perceived corruption ranging from 0 to 10.   Transparency International has published an 
annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) since 1995, in which corruption is assumed to 
exist among public officials and politicians, who use entrusted power for private gain.  
The CPI uses polls and surveys institutions.12  The CPI produces a single score per 
country, which as noted above, cannot be compared year-to-year.   
                                                          
12 Institutions surveyed are Columbia University, Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Freedom House, Information International, International Institute for Management 
Development, United Nations Economic Commission. Only experts are polled.  
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The homicide rate per 100,000 people (HOMICIDE) is determined by Interpol, 
the United Nations (UN), or the World Health Organization (WHO) for the year 2008. 
The legal definition of homicide may differ between countries and the demographics are 
affected by trauma care, which determines the lethality of the violence.  This is a general 
measure of societal violence and may not capture some countries violent crimes. 
 Heroin can be legally prescribed with psychological care in a few countries.  A 
dummy variable (SCRIPT) has been assigned a value of 1 if the country allows this 
practice and a 0 if not.  The information was provided by the European Legal Database 
on Drugs from the EMCDDA and government policy. A summary of statistics is shown 
in Table 4.1 
The U.S. is not included due to Mexico having the capability to produce 30 to 40 
metric tons (mt) of heroin each year and the U.S. consumes only 20mt.  The Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) has stated that a majority of the heroin the U.S. consumes is 
from Mexico and South America. 
 
Table 4.1 
                                         Summary of statistics. 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
USER (per 100,000) 277.75 199.63 22.71 1155.52 
SUPPLY  (per 100,000) 17.33 11.50 0.75 51.75 
HOMICIDE (per 100,000) 3.10 3.65 0.70 18.90 
LE (per 100,000) 253.84 155.29 15.14 754.50 
PRICE ($ per gram) 64.08 35.69 2.40 150.00 
SHIP 0.14 0.35 0 1 
MUSLIM 0.14 0.35 0 1 
SCRIPT 0.42 0.50 0 1 
INCORRUPT 5.43 2.38 1.50 9.40 
AID (hundred thousands) 5299.86 11357.15 0 53446.60 
Observations 36 
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Table 4.2 
List of countries analyzed. 
Afghanistan Denmark Latvia Serbia  
Albania Finland Lithuania Slovakia 
Austria France Netherlands Slovenia 
Belarus Germany Norway Spain 
Belgium Greece Pakistan Sweden 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Hungary Poland Switzerland 
Bulgaria Iran Portugal Turkey 
Croatia Ireland Romania United Kingdom 
Czech Republic Italy  Russian Federation Ukraine 
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5. Empirical Results 
            Table 5.1 presents the estimates of heroin users and supply in a cross section of 
data.  Results of the first stage regression build a simultaneous system for the price of 
heroin.  This stage ran an OLS of the endogenous PRICE variable against all other 
exogenous variables.   
Table 5.1:  
2SLS estimation results. 
    
First Stage 
PRICE   
2SLS 
USERS   
2SLS 
SUPPLY 
constant   33.871     385.59 **   1.111   
    (20.706)     (144.459)     (6.541)   
                    
AID   -0.0006     0.005         
    (0.0004)     (0.003)         
                    
INCORRUPT   5.755 *         -0.598   
    (3.135)           (1.203)   
                    
HOMICIDE   3.235 *   33.769 **       
    (1.753)     (8.386)         
                    
LE   -0.043           0.009   
    (0.032)           (0.01)   
                    
MUSLIM   -29.541     -246.51 **       
    (23.428)     (154.153)         
                    
SCRIPT   12.374 *   188.27 **       
    (12.13)     (83.207)         
                    
SHIP   -27.906           26.803 ** 
    (23.719)           (6.607)   
                    
PRICE^         -3.964 *   0.228 ** 
          (2.303)     (0.111)   
                    
Observations   36     36     36   
F-statistic   5.209     3.702     4.387   
R-squared   0.565     0.379     0.361   
Adjusted R-squared 0.457     0.275     0.277   
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, standard errors are in parentheses.   
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The dependent variables in second stage regressions are influenced differently 
than those influencing PRICE^.  In theory, drug seizures reduce the supply of drugs, 
which causes a new equilibrium where the price is higher and quantity lower.   In the 
USER estimation, PRICE matches the law of demand.  The simultaneous PRICE effect 
occurs in the SUPPLY estimation.  As the price of heroin increases, the supply of the drug 
will increase as well.   Results from Table 5.1, heroin suppliers will increase shipment by 
0.22kg when price increases by one.   
Contrary to the results of this research, one alternative assumption to the 
significance of PRICE is that having an inelastic demand for heroin causes total revenue 
to increase for drug dealer.  Heroin dealers can increase prices until the user switches to 
an alternative.  A switch to other drugs if heroin becomes expensive is not necessarily 
considered, but this research suggests otherwise.  The substitution effect is significant at 
the distribution and consumption levels because heroin consumers are more affected by 
PRICE.    
Demand is relatively inelastic for heroin, because drug addicts are typically 
constrained by their monetary budget. This constraint causes a shift to other drugs 
waiting for the market price of heroin to decrease.  Overall, a drug user’s demand is 
inelastic for a product that produces a “high,” but their consumption of a specific drug 
will utilize the substitution effect for a limited time period.13   The substitution effect 
increases demand for alternatives to heroin that produce a similar “high” such as opiates 
and opioids; these narcotic analgesics (painkiller) act on the central nervous system of 
humans (Kee and Hayes 2002).  
 Opiates are naturally occurring opiate alkaloids found in the opium poppy, 
basically only morphine and codeine. Opioids come in two forms, semi and fully 
synthetic (Kee and Hayes 2002).  Semi-synthetic opioids are drugs that do not naturally 
occur and ones that are "chemically built" on opiates (Kee and Hayes 2002).14  Fully-
                                                          
13 Usually one to three months, could be prolonged if the heroin price per 
kilogram is too expensive.  This is possible within Europe, due to law enforcement 
seizure rates in a country.     
14 Examples of semi-synthetic opioids include hydrocodone, oxycodone, 
oxymorphone, hydromorphone, and diacetylmorphine (heroin). 
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synthetic opioids are completely man made and not chemically related to opiates (Kee 
and Hayes 2002).15  Demand is inelastic when the opioid and opiate market is combined, 
unlike the demand a specific opiate or opioid (e.g. heroin) is relatively inelastic.  
 From Table 5.1, in the USER column, the p-values for MUSLIM, HOMICIDE, 
and SCRIPT are significant 5%.  MUSLIM  has a large negative effect on the USER, 
because Sharia Law prohibits use of such intoxicants.16  The USER decreases by 246.51 
per 100,000 in a country at least 50% follow Islam.  
 HOMICIDE has been shown in many empirical studies to increase the presence of 
narcotics.  When the number of heroin users increases by 1 then the rate of homicides 
increases by 33.77 per 100,000 people. HOMICIDE is not a predetermined cause of drug 
use, but is an indicator of the number of violent crimes in a country.  Drug use does not 
cause a violent event, but there is a correlation between mood altering substance and 
increased likelihood of violence.  The flow of heroin through a country will increase 
violence.   
 SCRIPT is significant and has a large effect on heroin users because these 
countries were already prone to excessive use.  The problem was drastic enough to make 
prescribing heroin legal, because methadone is an insufficient substitute.  If prescribing 
heroin is legal in a country, then USER will increase by 188.27 per 100,000 people.   The 
increase can be from various factors such as immigration, historically high drug use, and 
proximity to countries on the main heroin supply network.   
The p-value for PRICE is significant at a 10% level, and reduces USER by 3.96 
per 100,000 people.  Killias and Aebi’s Switzerland trials in research studies confirm the 
results in this research (Killias and Aebi 1998).  
Results in the SUPPLY column in Table 5.1 displayed the expected sign for 
PRICE.  The supply increased when the price increased; if PRICE goes up by $1, then 
SUPPLY in each country increases by 0.22 kg. PRICE reflects the law of supply offering 
                                                          
15 Examples of fully-synthetic opioids include methadone, fentanyl, 
dextropropoxyphene, tramadol, and pethidine. 
16 Quran, Noble Verse 2:219:  They will ask thee about intoxicants and games of 
chance. Say: "In both there is great evil as well as some benefit for man; but the evil 
which they cause is greater than the benefit which they bring." 
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more of the commodity at a higher price.  This may be true for one year, but the trend 
differs from heroin prices over the last two decades.   Heroin supply increased by an 
average 10% each year since 1990 because the seizure rate in the majority of the 36 
countries analyzed are increasing. 17 The supply curve may not be shifting after 2001, but 
just moving along the demand curve because the number of heroin users has remain 
relatively stable.   
 
Figure 5.1 Western Europe price ($/gram) and Afghanistan heroin supply (kg) 
(UNODC 2010). 
Figure 5.1 provides significant evidence until 1998 there was a constant supply 
and declining price.  After 1998, foreign governments and the United Nations influenced 
Afghanistan by the UN Security Council sanction against the Taliban.  The Taliban 
partially complied with the sanction to end illicit drug cultivation, but not to cease 
terrorist support.18  Even the end of drug cultivation was a ‘front.’  The Taliban complied 
because they had an excess supply from previous years, which is why from 1999 till 2002 
the price remained constant.  From 2002 until 2008 the supply increased, but the price is 
constant because the seizure rates have increased along the heroin supply route.   
                                                          
17 Seizure rates have drastically decreased in Pakistan. 
18 UN Security Council Sanction 1267. 
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The seizure rates lead back to Table 5.1 to explain SHIP.  It is expected that major 
shipping routes see a large influx of heroin, demonstrating the proximately effect of 
bordering nations to Afghanistan.   Law enforcement and the public at large are aware of 
the ample supply of heroin leaving Afghanistan. The shipping routes adjust to law 
enforcement changes causing drug smugglers to move heroin through different regions.  
These changes in drug smuggling routes will causes shortages and surpluses affecting the 
heroin user’s behavior.   Higher revenue generated from consumption and distribution of 
heroin can increase the crime rate straining law enforcement in these regions.   LE and 
INCORRUPT  from Table 5.1 may not be statistically significant due in part to the vast 
range of economic factors, legal rights, harsher punishment for the user or dealer, and 
level of organized crime in 36 different countries.  
The government controls legislation for social programs and the proper use of 
foreign aid.  The intent of the aid may be direct and properly legislated, but corruption 
and poor implementation can render no positive value for society.  Throughout the 36 
countries analyzed, there is an immense diversity in political processes.  AID is not 
significant in Western European countries, but can display the other countries failure to 
govern.   ‘Western’ governments develop social programs that do not meet specific and 
general social needs of a country, leading to failure.  The misuse of AID by governments 
and the diversity of use led to the variable having no statistical significance in Table 5.1 
USER column.   
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6. Discussion 
The data and model in this research provide a basic starting point that can inspire 
further research with robust data.  Ideally, a panel data set starting from 1988 to present 
would be formulated.  Data before the Afghan Civil War is needed to show the change 
since the Taliban takeover.  Problems with the empirical work pertaining to the purity of 
heroin in each country can cause inconsistent pricing throughout the European Union.  
The data was derived from the peak of the heroin trade in 2008. Markets operate 
significantly different when working with maximum profits.  
In this research a variety of reasons for the heroin markets prosperity can be 
supported by changes in Europe’s foreign and domestic policy, law enforcement, 
corruption, and crime rates. The recent conflict in Afghanistan has lowered European 
heroin prices, increased seizure rates, and provided funding for insurgents. The Taliban’s 
profits are an estimated $125 million per year from heroin production and another $250 
million for convoy protection (Peters 2009).  As a result of an increased supply of heroin 
and reduced price, European law enforcement and government officials face a larger drug 
war against heroin because the scale of production in Afghanistan has increased.   
The use of the two-stage least squares model has shown the effect of Europe’s 
heroin issues in Table 5.1.   The data reveals the impact of government policies such as 
legal heroin prescriptions and increased law enforcement.  In the USER column, 
HOMICIDE, MUSLIM, and SCRIPT are statistically significant at the 5% level and 
PRICE at 10%. As PRICE increases by one U.S. dollar per gram, USER decreases by 
3.96 per 100,000. In the USER estimation PRICE matches the law of demand.  The 
simultaneous price effect occurs in the SUPPLY estimation.  If the price of heroin 
increases, smugglers and dealers that only ship larger quantities of the drug will see a 
greater profit.  Heroin suppliers will increase shipment by 0.22kg when price increase by 
one dollar per gram.   
When heroin users increases by 1 then the rate of homicides increase by 33.77 per 
100,000 people.  An increase in heroin use has been shown to increase violent crime, 
property crime, and decrease social welfare.  A future study of specific crime rates, social 
welfare, and a measurement of heroin consumption could test this hypothesis.  Europe 
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must find a level of deterrence that effectively distributes the punishment to the dealer 
and consumer.  
The reduced punishment of heroin consumers can decrease the cost of 
incarceration if prescribing heroin is legal in a country. When heroin can be legally 
prescribed the USER will increase by 188.27 per 100,000. An option to counteract the 
increase in USER is to increase the punishment for drug dealers in a country. By 
punishing the drug dealers more than users, the heroin prescription program may have a 
larger positive social impact.  The increase of heroin users can come from various factors 
such as immigration for heroin prescription use, historically high illicit drug use, 
insufficient punishment of drug dealers, and proximity to countries on the main heroin 
supply network. Further analysis is required for a specific cause between the prescription 
drug program and the penalty for drug dealers in a country.    
Shipping routes are a significant factor in the heroin network because larger 
influxes of supply will occur when the demand increases. As the demand increases, drug 
cartels and dealers add impurities to increase their supply. As the heroin leaves Pakistan, 
Iran, and Russia the purity decreases and quantity seized increases.   The impurities will 
benefit the drug cartels or dealers because they know that a certain percentage will be 
seized.  Higher seizure rates in a country may lead to an increase in violence and 
corruption, which has been seen in many Islamic countries within close proximity to 
Afghanistan.   In Islamic countries (e.g. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) the low quality of 
law enforcement and high corruption will lead to heroin smugglers being protected by 
government officials, warlords, or insurgents because of the profits from the heroin 
market.   
The scale of heroin use in Islamic countries compared to non-Islamic countries is 
revealed by this research, the USER decreases by 246.51 per 100,000 in a country in 
which at least 50% of the population follows Islam. These actions of corruption and drug 
trafficking are against Sharia law and the violation is considered to be ‘haram’ or 
performing an action forbidden by law.  The shipment of heroin through Islamic 
countries reveals that the drug profits outweigh their religious beliefs.  In Islamic 
countries, the high heroin flows and low consumption rates allow the drug to be cheaper 
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for the effective ‘high’ than other drugs in the European market.  Averages from the 
EMCDDA estimates a heroin user typically administers 100mg at a cost of 5.87 Euros 
and a 100mg of cocaine is 6.26 Euros (EMCDDA 2011).   Heroin is more popular in 
Europe than other regions of the world, because of the history of use and the low price 
due to a consistent supply from Afghanistan.   
This research displayed a general estimation for heroin use and distribution 
between countries that are supplied by Afghanistan.  Heroin is unique because it can 
generate wealth to facilitate conflict. Whether heroin directly supports insurgent’s 
vitality, or simply provides critical revenue which facilitates the violent pursuit of other 
objectives does not matter.  The ever evolving heroin profits give insurgents political 
justification and have changed government policies in Europe. The effects of the heroin 
trade are global, but substantially affect Europe.  Each European country is unique in 
demographics, but shares a common problem, heroin use.   
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